Aviation industry of the USSR. People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry - Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR

Kolpakov Sergey Konstantinovich,
General Director of the Interdepartmental Analytical Center

The recent history of Russia, with its inherent traditions and ambitions of a major aircraft building power, would be incomplete without an analysis of what happened in aviation industry since the late 1980s. In the USSR, this industry has traditionally been viewed as a factor of national security, an important source of national income, a highly skilled employment area, and a means of maintaining the image of a scientifically and technologically advanced country. The problems and successes of the industry are acquiring a national scale, attracting increased attention from government bodies, political forces, and funds. mass media, the public. The domestic aviation industry was deeply involved in the economic, social and even political processes and upheavals that took place in our country in its recent history.

Late 1980s - 1991

In the last years of the existence of the USSR, the aviation industry retained its previously created ability to develop and mass-produce all the main types of civil and military aircraft, including almost the entire range of materials and components for aircraft and helicopters. By the end of the 1980s, the lag in the unofficial Soviet-American competition for world leadership in the aircraft industry has not yet acquired open forms and was noticeable only to specialists. The number of people employed in the aviation industry exceeded 2 million people. The Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) was in charge of about 250 enterprises directly involved in the development and production of aviation equipment. Long technological chains of its creation went beyond the formal boundaries of the industry and involved numerous enterprises of related industries in the mass production of aircraft and helicopters.

The industry was focused primarily on the development and production of military aircraft. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the USSR annually produced hundreds of military aircraft and helicopters to equip the Armed Forces and export them. But even in the civilian segment, mass production was organized in the Soviet years: up to 150 aircraft and about 300 helicopters were produced per year. The production of civil aviation equipment provided not only domestic needs, but also export deliveries - mainly to the socialist countries.

Despite the serial production of civil aviation equipment, the main thing was that the aviation industry belonged to the military-industrial complex, which largely determined the processes that took place in the industry in the last 3-5 years of the existence of the USSR. The deep economic crisis, the growing external debt, the budget deficit and, as a result, the inevitable reduction in military spending led to a significant reduction in the state defense order. The change in the military-strategic picture of the world, the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the system of satellite countries of the former USSR sharply reduced the export of weapons and military equipment. Under the threat of destruction of scientific, technical, industrial and human resources defense industries, as well as the possible social consequences of this, decisions were made on the conversion of military production. A conversion campaign has begun in the country, covering all branches of the defense industry, including aviation.

The party and economic leadership of the country sought to give the conversion the appearance of a gesture of goodwill, a peaceful initiative in line with the policy of "détente" and "new political thinking". In December 1987, M. S. Gorbachev called for the organization international conference on "economic conversion", at which, according to the idea of ​​the initiators, all countries with a developed military industry were to acquaint each other with their conversion plans. A year later, speaking at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, M. S. Gorbachev spoke about the readiness Soviet Union to develop a conversion program, to prepare during 1989 as an experiment plans for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises, to publish the experience of employment of specialists from the military industry, the use of its equipment, buildings and structures in civilian production. And he again called on all states, primarily major military powers, to submit their conversion plans to the UN, to entrust a group of scientists with an in-depth analysis of conversion problems in general and in relation to individual countries and regions for a subsequent report to the UN Secretary General and consideration at a session of the General Assembly.

In September 1990, the first "Program for the conversion of the defense industry and the development of civilian production in the defense complex for the period up to 1995" was approved. It provided for huge capital investments to more than double the output of civilian products at defense industry enterprises, primarily through the conversion of armaments and military equipment production. Initially, the Program was implemented, although not completely, thanks to budgetary financing of defense enterprises that received state orders for the production of civilian products. The goal of sustaining and deepening conversion through market sales of conversion products was more of a slogan than a reality.

Since the country's leadership expected to get a return on conversion as soon as possible, and in the aircraft industry, the cycles of development and pre-production, testing and certification did not fit into short-term guidelines, it could only be a question of deploying the production of those aircraft, the development of which was in the final stage. At the turn of the 1980s-1990s, their choice was not wide. Test flights of prototypes of civil aircraft Tu-204 (first flight January 2, 1989), Il-96 (September 28, 1989) and Il-114 (March 29, 1990) began. Accordingly, cases of transferring production from military to civil aircraft turned out to be rare. One example is the conversion of the Ulyanovsk Aviation Plant to the production of the newly developed Tu-204 civil aircraft. Prior to this, the plant was engaged in the production of super-heavy An-124 Ruslan military transport aircraft.

Basically, the enterprises of the aviation industry received conversion tasks for the production of medical equipment, consumer goods, technological equipment for the processing industries of the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade and Catering. For example, the Sukhoi Design Bureau received state orders and budget funding for the development of technological equipment for processing fruits, packaging sugar and cereals, as well as for the development of washing machines. Industry enterprises dynamically increased the share of such products: from 30 to 45% in 1989-1991.

Despite the decrease in the output of military aircraft and the increase in the share of non-aviation products in the structure of production, the serial production of aircraft and helicopters continued. The collapsing administrative and economic system, even in the face of a comprehensive economic crisis, found funds to finance defense industry enterprises, not only for conversion, but also for specialized topics.

In the pre-reform years, the production of aircraft varied from 100 to 200 units per year (of which 60-70 were for civil purposes), and helicopters - from 300 to 400 units per year ( rice. one) .

A source: Association "Union of Aviation Engine Building".

Picture 1. Production of aircraft and helicopters in the USSR in 1981-1990, pieces

Behind the relatively favorable figures for the production of aircraft, helicopters and non-core conversion products, one can not notice that the aviation industry, despite the privileged position of the defense industry, was not an enclave protected from the influence of the economic crisis and the decaying control system. The latter manifested itself, in particular, in the emergence of the Russian vertical of power, which was increasingly asserting itself in the operational management of enterprises and in lawmaking.

In 1990, the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR arose, until the end of 1991 it acted in parallel with the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR. The heads of enterprises were forced to choose who to consider more important. On one side of the scale were the popularity and authority of Russian leaders - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Prime Minister I.S. financing.

A similar duality developed in the field of legislation. For industrial enterprises, the most noticeable were the inconsistencies of the Soviet Law "On state enterprise"and the Russian Law "On enterprises and entrepreneurial activity”, as well as the Soviet and Russian laws “On Property”, adopted in March 1990 in the USSR and in December of the same year in the RSFSR.

Notable innovations in the management of aviation enterprises were the councils of labor collectives and the election of general directors. Spontaneous and organized privatization of enterprises began. Spontaneously, without management "from above", self-supporting divisions, centers of scientific and technical creativity of youth, cooperatives were born at aviation enterprises and around them, which instead of the parent enterprise received state and extra-budgetary funding.

At the same time, the aviation industry has become a pioneer among the defense industries in organized denationalization. By a special resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Saratov Aviation Plant and the Saratov Electric Unit Production Association were transformed into collective enterprises. During the formation of collective enterprises, production assets depreciated by 70% or more were transferred to the ownership of labor collectives free of charge; production assets acquired at the expense of profits received during the period of work on self-supporting basis; subsidiary plots, infrastructure; objects social sphere, housing stock, which was on the balance sheet of enterprises. The rest of the property was to be transferred with payment in installments at the residual value.

Subsequently, no payment by installments followed, and the collective enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies without state participation. Saratov Aviation Plant, becoming the first privatized enterprise in the industry, clearly demonstrated that privatization in itself does not guarantee effective management and competitiveness. 10 years later, the governor of the Saratov region, D. F. Ayatskov, due to the disastrous financial and economic situation of the plant, raised the issue of returning it to state ownership.

"Perestroika", "detente", "new political thinking" as a general foreign policy background contributed to the organization of the first projects of international cooperation in the aviation industry. So, at the end of 1989, the Ilyushin Design Bureau and the American companies Pratt & Whitney and Rockwell Collins agreed to create passenger and cargo modifications of the Il-96 aircraft with engines and avionics produced by these companies. The corresponding agreement was signed in June 1991 at the Paris Air Show. It was planned to certify Westernized modifications (Il-96 M/T) according to American airworthiness standards for subsequent promotion to the world market. This project, unlike many similar attempts of that time and subsequent years, was brought to at least an intermediate result - obtaining an American certificate for a cargo modification of the Il-96T. However, the aircraft did not find demand on the market, not a single aircraft was sold, and design developments were later used to create the Il-96-400T cargo aircraft.

Thus, in the late 1980s, the Soviet aircraft industry, taking advantage of its special status and the corresponding budget support, retained the ability to develop and produce aircraft of various types and purposes, despite the deep economic crisis in the country.

1990s

After the collapse of the USSR, large aircraft manufacturing enterprises found themselves outside Russia: the Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex (ANTK) named after O. K. Antonov in Kyiv, the Kyiv Aviation Plant Aviant, the Kharkov State Aviation Production Enterprise (KhSAMC), the Tashkent Aviation Production Association named after V P. Chkalova (TAPOiCh), Zaporozhye machine-building design bureau "Progress" named after academician A. G. Ivchenko (SE "Ivchenko-Progress") and the Zaporozhye plant "Motor Sich", Tbilisi Aviation Plant, etc. In Russia at the time of acquisition state independence, there were 214 enterprises in the industry, including 28 research institutes, 72 design bureaus and 114 serial plants that were previously under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR, that is, almost all organizations and institutions of industry science, the main share of the design and production potential of the Soviet aircraft building complex.

A misleading impression may arise that the consequences of spinning off a small share of the aircraft manufacturing enterprises of the former USSR in the conditions of their obvious redundancy were not particularly noticeable. But this is not so, if only because, as a result of the division of the Soviet aviation industry, Russia completely and for a long time lost the potential to create military transport aircraft. The design base of almost all the aircraft that were in service with the military transport aviation of Russia ended up in Ukraine. There were designed and in most cases produced light (An-26, An-32, An-74), medium (An-12) and super heavy (An-22, An-124) military transport aircraft. The production facilities of the Tashkent Aviation Production Association, which ensured the production of the Il-76 heavy military transport aircraft (the only military transport aircraft developed in Russia among those in service with the Air Force), ended up in independent Uzbekistan. Russia still has not been able to restore independent production military transport aircraft.

The exit of the Antonov Design Bureau from the single aircraft industrial complex led to serious problems associated with the interstate nature of relations in the production of An-38 in Novosibirsk, An-140 in Samara, and An-148 in Voronezh. The "Ukrainian factor" affected the cooperation and competition of the Russian civil aircraft industry with the Chinese and Iranian aircraft construction complexes being created. The deployment in Tashkent of serial production of the Russian-designed Il-114 passenger aircraft has also become a matter of international relations.

So far, it has not been possible to compensate for the loss of the Zaporozhye aircraft engine building complex (Ivchenko-Progress and Motor Sich), which supplies helicopter and aircraft engines to Russia. Less significant for the military-industrial potential of Russia, but very politically sensitive, was the loss of the Tbilisi Aviation Plant, which produced the legendary attack aircraft of the Afghan war - the Su-25. Immediately after secession, Georgia began to independently repair the numerous fleet of these aircraft that ended up in the CIS countries and the former Warsaw Pact, and, together with Israel, began a project to modernize this model. The participation of the Sukhoi Design Bureau in this project was hampered by the instability of Russian-Georgian relations. And after the Russian bombing of the factory airfield during the operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008, this opportunity turned out to be completely lost.

As for the Belarusian enterprises, their separation did not create visible problems. The existence of the Belarusian part of the Soviet aviation industry is only occasionally reminded by the initiatives of the allied Russian-Belarusian government. One of them is the failed project for the deep modernization of the Tu-134 passenger aircraft at Minsk aircraft repair plant, which has been the main repair base for this aircraft since Soviet times.

Thus, the separation of the Ukrainian and Uzbek parts of the aircraft building complex of the former USSR turned out to be the most sensitive for the Russian aviation industry. This separation was not properly understood and legally formalized, especially in terms of rights to the results of intellectual activity. The trail of unresolved problems that arose as a result of illusions about the de facto unity of the aircraft manufacturing complex and the inevitability of its imminent de jure reunification is still dragging on.

Whatever the consequences of the division of the Soviet legacy, it was undeniable that Russia in the early 1990s became the owner of one of the world's largest aircraft manufacturing complexes. On its territory there were only about 30 assembly plants that ensured the final production of aircraft, helicopters and engines. Therefore, it is not surprising that the preservation and development of the national aviation industry was immediately declared a state priority in independent Russia. It was believed that this industry should become the locomotive of high-tech economic development.

The implementation of such an ambitious task was first led by the Ministry of Industry, and after its disbandment in 1992, by the newly formed Roskomoboronprom (since 1993 - Goskomoboronprom, since 1996 - the Ministry of Defense Industry). In 1997, the Ministry of Defense Industry was also liquidated, the management of the industry was transferred to the Ministry of Economy, and in 1999 - to Rosaviakosmos. It is not surprising that with such variability of state administration bodies, the sectoral industrial policy and its reform in the conditions of the most acute economic crisis were not really carried out. Enterprise management turned out to be concentrated in the hands of directors, and then owners, who often combined both roles in one person.

Production and supply of aircraft to the market in the 1990s

Despite declarations about the priority status of the aircraft industry for the country, its high competitive positions and related expectations sustainable development, with the beginning of economic reforms, the decline in production in the industry became landslide. Almost all of the 1990s, the production of military and civil aviation equipment, as well as non-aviation products (mainly consumer goods, the production of which was mastered in the Soviet period), was declining. Growth began only in 1998, mainly due to the revival of the output of military products ( rice. 2).

A source

Figure 2. Dynamics of production of aircraft industry products in comparable prices, 1992 = 100%

In 1997, the total volume of production fell to 21.7% of the 1992 level, and military aviation equipment - by 4 times. The minimum output of civil aviation equipment fell in 1998, having fallen by 8 times compared to 1992, and for civilian non-aviation products - by 6 times. Conversion products could not compete with imported products that filled the domestic market as a result of the liberalization of foreign trade.

The main reason for the decline in the production of military aircraft was the reduction in military spending in the country's budget. The deep economic crisis and the threat of a social explosion in the country required the minimization of spending on the purchase of weapons and military equipment; in 1992, compared to 1991, they were cut immediately by 67%. IN subsequent years budget spending in terms of the technical equipment of the Armed Forces (R & D and purchases) continued to decline.

The sharp drop in military purchases in the 1990s was partly dampened by the export deliveries of Su-27 and MiG-29 combat aircraft in various modifications and Mi-8, Mi-17 and Ka-32 helicopters. However, a large-scale resumption of export deliveries of military aircraft began only a few years after the collapse of the USSR. In the first half of the 1990s, the world market was flooded with offers of Soviet military aircraft and helicopters that were being withdrawn from service in the former Soviet republics and countries that were previously part of the Warsaw Pact. Only in 1995 did Russia manage to turn the tide and for the first time after several years of decline increase the export of aviation weapons. Prior to that, it was limited to the supply of approximately 30 Su-27 fighters to China as part of fulfilling obligations under contracts concluded back in the Soviet period. These aircraft were produced by the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association named after Yu. A. Gagarin (KnAAPO) and the Irkutsk Aviation Plant.

In the mid-1990s, aircraft exports intensified, and several large deals were concluded. In particular, in 1994-1995 28 MiG-29 fighters were delivered to Hungary, in 1995 to Malaysia - 18 such machines (the first delivery of combat aircraft to this country). At the same time, the first post-Soviet contracts were signed to continue deliveries of Su-27 fighters to China. Moreover, one of them, concluded in 1996, provided for the supply of not finished aircraft, but vehicle kits for their subsequent licensed assembly in China. Deliveries began in 1998 and continued until 2003.

In 1996, a truly breakthrough long-term contract was concluded with India for the supply of 90 Su-30MKI aircraft (deep modernization of the Su-27UB combat trainer) and another 140 vehicle kits for licensed assembly of this aircraft at the facilities of the Indian aircraft manufacturing corporation Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The "motor" of the deal was the first in Russia private aircraft building corporation "Irkut", created on the basis of the Irkutsk Aviation Plant - the manufacturer of the two-seat combat training modification of the Su-27. In the contract for the first time in domestic system military-technical cooperation provided for the installation, at the request of the customer, on Russian combat aircraft of Israeli and Western European elements of on-board equipment. Later, on the basis of the machine for India, modifications were created for Malaysia (Su-30 MKM) and Algeria (Su-30 MKA).

In the civilian segment of the aviation industry in the first half of the 1990s, the decline in output was even sharper than in the military segment. In 1991, 62 aircraft were produced (without light ones), in 1992 - 81, in 1995 - 22, in 1996 - 5, helicopters in 1991 - 249, in 1992 - 337, in 1995 - 80, in 1996 - 65 ( rice. 3). Against the background of a general decline in production in the industry, the share of civilian aircraft production decreased from 30 to 15% in 1991-1998.

A source

Figure 3 Production of civil aircraft (without light ones) and helicopters in 1989-1998, pieces

The decline in production did not begin immediately. In 1991-1993, there was a short-term surge in deliveries of newly produced aircraft and helicopters. Purchases of new passenger and cargo aircraft during these years exceeded even the annual deliveries of the 1980s, a period of record volumes of air traffic and its growth rates. Against the backdrop of an intense decline in demand for air transport services, the purchase of new aircraft in the early 1990s seems like a paradox. But he has an explanation.

In 1992, the decentralization of the country's air transport system took place. Aeroflot was divided into 269 independent airlines, which were previously its structural divisions - joint aviation squadrons and separate air squadrons. Independent airlines were also created on the basis of airlines that had aircraft of their own production. At the same time, a privatization program was launched in Russia, which envisaged that the labor collectives and management of newly formed airlines would have the opportunity to acquire assets of enterprises on preferential terms during privatization.

It still functioned well back then. centralized system public procurement aircraft at the request of airlines (budget funding for the purchase of civil aircraft actually ceased in 1994, and the public procurement system was completely abolished in 1996). Thus, the possibility of acquiring aircraft at the expense of the state budget and the expectation in the future to receive it as part of a property complex privatized under a preferential scheme have sharply increased the activity of management in acquiring aircraft.

However, the surge in orders for new aircraft did not last long. The collapse in deliveries occurred in 1994, when the redundancy of the fleet of Russian airlines became apparent. It was caused not only by accelerated purchases of new aircraft, but also by a sharp drop in air traffic, the emergence of other sources of replenishment of the Russian aircraft fleet, and a slowdown in the rate of decommissioning of obsolete aircraft.

Fall in air travel. In 1990, the volume of passenger air transportation reached a record level - more than 94 million passengers, and since 1991 it began to fall ( rice. 4). In 1992, air transportation decreased immediately by 31%, in 1993 - by 35%. Subsequently, the rate of reduction decreased, but the decline continued. The lowest levels of air travel in post-Soviet history were recorded in 1999 and 2000, with less than 22 million passengers, about the same as in 1970. If it were not for the freedom of Russians to travel abroad, which led to the growth of air travel on international airlines, the overall decline would have been even more dramatic.

A source: State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, Transport Clearing House.

Figure 4 Dynamics of passenger air transportation in Russia in 1980-2000, million people

The decline in passenger traffic on domestic routes in 1991-1999 occurred as a result of a sharp decline in real money incomes of the population, the rapid growth of air fares (especially in comparison with ticket prices for alternative modes of transport), the reduction in business activity during the crisis and "regionalization" economic relations of enterprises.

New sources of replenishment of the Russian aircraft fleet. Russian airlines, experiencing financial difficulties due to the fall in air traffic, began to replenish their fleet in more economical ways: they imported foreign aircraft on a lease basis, re-exported used Soviet-made aircraft, and purchased official aircraft from the fleets of departments and enterprises.

The existing customs barriers turned out to be "transparent" for aircraft of the world's largest manufacturers - Boeing and Airbus. None of the 46 foreign-made aircraft imported into Russia in the 1990s under a leasing scheme was subject to customs payments. The fact is that the version of the Customs Code that was in force at that time made it possible to organize a preferential import regime for aircraft by combining the possibility of temporary importation, an unlimited extension of the period of temporary importation, and complete exemption from customs duties for temporarily imported goods. The Customs Code allowed the State Customs Committee and the government to take individual solutions on the extension of the period of temporary importation and exemption from customs duties of temporarily imported goods, which in fact meant a legalized opportunity to provide airlines with individual conditions import of foreign aircraft. In May and September 1994, by government decrees, Aeroflot was completely exempted from paying customs duties and taxes on A310 and B767 aircraft temporarily imported into Russia. In December 1994, the Transaero airline also took advantage of this precedent. In total, in 1994-1997, the government issued seven such orders.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the former socialist countries and the Baltic republics began to abandon the use of Soviet aircraft, switched to the use of Western-made aircraft. The reverse importation of Soviet-made aircraft, which was quite suitable for operation and had a significant resource reserve, began, not controlled by the Russian aviation authorities. In the 1990s, only about 70 mainline passenger aircraft were returned to the country. Re-export continued on an ever-increasing scale in subsequent years.

The fleet of Russian airlines was also replenished by transferring official aircraft into commercial operation. In the USSR, official aircraft were actively used by the Soviet nomenklatura - from directors of large enterprises to commanders of military districts. Aircraft of this category entered the secondary market in the early 1990s, this channel operated until 1997 and ensured the supply of approximately 100 main-class aircraft.

Decreased rate of decommissioning of obsolete aircraft. In the 1990s, the rate of aircraft decommissioning was far behind the planned ones, since, on the one hand, the intensity of their operation decreased, on the other hand, it was widely practiced to extend the resources of the existing aircraft fleet. All subjects of the aviation market were interested in the extension - airlines that did not have the funds to renew the fleet, aircraft developers who made money on the paid procedure for extending resources, the manufacturers themselves, for whom the repair of old aircraft during the sales crisis became almost the only source of financial income.

Thus, different channels for replenishing the fleet and the delay in decommissioning aircraft that have exhausted their assigned service life made it possible not only to maintain the list of aircraft (in 1991, about 1,500 mainline aircraft), but even to slightly increase it. Against the background of a three-fold reduction in air traffic and the poor financial and economic condition of airlines, this meant an extreme decrease in demand for new domestic aircraft, the threat of which was not taken into account. But it was the lack of demand that became one of the main problems of the industry in the 1990s, another problem was with the supply.

Programs and projects for the creation and promotion of new aircraft on the market

Funding for projects to create a new generation of military aircraft in the 1990s was extremely scarce due to budgetary restrictions. Budget R&D programs were aimed mainly at the modernization of mass-produced aircraft. New developments were practically not funded. Enterprises managed to allocate part of the income from export contracts. The most striking result of such developments was the flights of the experimental Su-47 Berkut aircraft (former designation S-37), which was developed at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, began in September 1997. The main feature of the Berkut's aerodynamic layout was the swept back wing. At the same time, the Mikoyan Design Bureau throughout the decade carried out similar developments of a new generation fighter. The MiG 1.44 experimental vehicle was launched in February 2000.

In the 1990s, the task of promoting new competitive technology to the aviation market was assigned primarily to the civilian sector. The prospect of the predominance of civilian products over the military in the structure of the future production of the industry was fully consistent with the foreign policy course proclaimed by the new Russian government. The leaders of the industry and the economic bloc of the government saw two directions for bringing the civil sector of the aviation industry out of the crisis: the creation and launch of mass production of competitive new generation equipment and the construction of a system that would facilitate its promotion to the domestic and world markets. Both directions provided state support.

In order to create competitive aircraft in 1992, the government developed and since 1993 began to implement the "Program for the Development of Civil Aviation Engineering in Russia until 2000", subsequently extended until 2001. In 1996, she was given the status of "presidential". The program included 32 projects for the creation and modification of civil aircraft and helicopters, 28 projects for the development and modernization of aircraft engines, 19 projects for research and experimental work. Technological re-equipment of production, expansion, reconstruction and construction of facilities were also envisaged. industrial purpose. As a result, by the year 2000 it was necessary to create a new generation of aircraft corresponding to the world level.

The very number of projects shows that the Program was formed without regard to the state budget and the financial and economic situation of airlines, which had to invest their own funds in projects. In addition, the depth of the narrowing demand for new domestic aviation equipment was not properly understood and taken into account, the range and terms for the creation of equipment included in the Program were based on too optimistic assessments of domestic needs and export opportunities.

The program was not fulfilled in all the main indicators, the forecasts of the annual volumes of deliveries of civil aircraft to Russian aviation enterprises and for export included in it differed from the actual figures by dozens of times. The main reason for the non-fulfillment of the Program was considered to be the lack of budget financing. For its implementation in 1992-1999, less than 13% of the budget was allocated and loans were provided for 38% of the funds provided for by the Program. Annual budget assignments were reduced by 2-6 times relative to program assignments.

But the reasons were not only the lack of public funding and practical absence financing from own and borrowed funds of enterprises, but also in the refusal to concentrate limited financial resources on the most important projects. Hence the indefinite delay in the implementation of projects for the creation and commissioning of aircraft, which, it would seem, had real chances of being promoted to the market, at least the domestic one.

A typical example: the project of the Tu-334 aircraft, which was supposed to replace the Tu-134, a mass short-haul aircraft of the previous generation. The development of the Tu-334 at the Tupolev Design Bureau began in the Soviet period. According to the rules of that time, the Kyiv Aviation Plant (now Aviant) was determined by directive to be the main serial plant for this project. It started pre-production. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian and Ukrainian authorities considered it expedient to continue the project in cooperation, which was recorded in the intergovernmental agreement of September 8, 1993. The preparation of production in Kyiv was agreed to be carried out at the expense of the Russian budget.

In parallel, within the framework of the conversion program, preparations began for the mass production of the Tu-334 aircraft at the Taganrog TAVIA plant, which was supposed to become the second assembly plant under the project. The Ministry of Industry was instructed to ensure the start of production of aircraft from 1994. To prepare for serial production, the unfinished fuselage of the aircraft in 1992 was transferred from the experimental production of the Tupolev Design Bureau to Taganrog. Work in Taganrog to complete the construction of the aircraft lasted about five years, was not completed and stopped in 1997 due to lack of budget funding.

In October 1999, the head organization for the Tu-334 project was determined Military industrial complex"MAPO" (now the Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG"), to which all rights to the results of intellectual activity created during the development of the aircraft at the Tupolev Design Bureau were transferred. Transferring rights and responsibilities, the government instructed Rosaviakosmos to start producing aircraft in 2002. In accordance with the new scheme for organizing the project, RAC "MiG" began construction of the Tu-334 aircraft model, the first for this aviation complex. To ensure the work, a fuselage was delivered to Moscow from Taganrog, which at one time arrived there from the experimental plant of the Tupolev Design Bureau.

Looking ahead, we note that in 2001, RAC "MiG" decided to transfer the production of aircraft from Moscow to the Lukhovitsky Aviation Production and Testing Complex (LAPIK). To do this, the construction of a production building began there. However, to start production of the aircraft at the new assembly site, technological preparation was required. For these purposes, the government allocated funding under the targeted investment program. The relevant government decree provided for the start of serial production of the Tu-334 aircraft in 2004.

In 2003, for the failure to launch the mass production of the Tu-334 aircraft, the general director of the RAC "MiG" was relieved of his post, and the responsibility for the new organization of mass production was assigned to the Gorbunov KAPO in Kazan, where in 2005 all that same fuselage. The start of production of the aircraft was postponed to 2007, but this did not happen in 2009 either. For flight tests, two experimental samples are used, assembled at the experimental plant of the Tupolev Design Bureau and at the Kiev Aviant plant.

Budget financing of the civil aviation industry was carried out within the framework of not only the "Program for the development of civil aviation technology in Russia until the year 2000", but also three short-term defense industry conversion programs, the National Technological Base program, the Federal Targeted Investment Program (FAIP), etc. aviation industry were directed primarily to the development and preparation for the production of the same civil aircraft that appeared in the "Program for the Development of Civil Aviation Engineering". But the mechanism of budget financing was used differently - conversion loans, which were provided to enterprises through authorized banks. Conversion loans were also issued for the implementation of projects that did not have an aviation focus, but made it possible to at least partially load aircraft manufacturing enterprises and retain personnel. For example, at the aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (KnAPO), on the basis of the workshop for testing equipment of the Su-27 fighter, the production of LG TVs was organized.

In addition to budget financing, aviation industry enterprises received temporary exemptions from taxes (tax credits), customs duties for imported equipment and components. Practiced restructuring and writing off debts to budgets of different levels, gratuitous transfer of rights to use the results of intellectual activity obtained in the course of fulfilling government orders for the development of civil aircraft, and other measures.

Support for civil aviation was not limited to the federal level. The subjects of the Federation also practiced various mechanisms to support and stimulate sales. For example, the government of Tatarstan financed the program for the creation of a 50-seat regional Tu-324 aircraft at the Tupolev Design Bureau and the preparation of its production at the Gorbunov KAPO. The government of Tatarstan proposed and the Russian government approved a pilot project financing scheme.

In accordance with it, KAPO named after Gorbunov was given the status of an oil exporter, which made it possible to purchase oil produced in the republic and export it as part of "deliveries for federal state needs." Foreign exchange earnings as the difference between the proceeds from the sale and the costs of oil production and transportation went to the budget of Tatarstan and were distributed by a group specially created under the republican government to manage the creation of the Tu-324 aircraft. In 1996-1997, 4 million tons were exported annually, the official exporter was KAPO named after Gorbunov. However, in 1998, only oil producing companies retained the right to export oil. This mechanism ceased to operate, and other sources of extrabudgetary funding for the project were not found, and it was frozen.

In order to promote civil aviation equipment on the market, the Government Decree of July 7, 1998 introduced compensation to the Russian aviation industry for the loss of potential orders from preferential (with exemption from customs duties) imports of foreign aircraft into the country. Obtaining privileges for the import of foreign aircraft was to be accompanied by the conclusion of agreements between airlines and manufacturers on the purchase of domestic aircraft for an amount up to three times higher than the customs privileges granted to airlines. This ruling turned out to be ineffective. Investment agreements with Aeroflot and Transaero were signed but not fulfilled. The main reason was that the aviation industry could not offer ready-made aircraft to airlines, and they did not finance the preparation of their production. As a result, Aeroflot and Transaero continued to import foreign aircraft on preferential terms on individual government orders without investing in the domestic aviation industry. Only in 2001 this practice was stopped.

Foreign manufacturers used leasing to supply foreign-made aircraft to Russian air carriers. This mechanism was seen as an opportunity to facilitate the promotion of Russian aircraft on the domestic market. Therefore, by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On additional measures for the development of civil aviation of the Russian Federation" dated June 7, 1996, the creation of a system for leasing domestic aircraft of a new generation was declared "one of the main directions public policy in the field of development of civil aviation”. However, in fact, the development of leasing began only in the 2000s.

Institutional changes

Privatization. The mass privatization of aviation enterprises was carried out in accordance with the "State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation", approved at the end of 1993 by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation. Truth, individual cases privatizations took place before the approval of the State Program. As already mentioned, the decision to privatize two Saratov enterprises was made back in January 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. At the end of 1991, the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex was privatized. Its property was transferred free of charge to the Aviastar joint-stock company, whose shareholders were the enterprise's labor collective and the Volga-Dnepr joint-stock company, a cargo airline based at the factory airfield.

In the course of mass privatization in the aviation industry, 224 enterprises, or 71% of all enterprises, were corporatized with varying degrees of state participation. Approximately 42% of privatized enterprises were corporatized without fixing shares in federal ownership, including the backbone open joint-stock companies A. S. Yakovlev Design Bureau, Lyulka-Saturn, Perm Motor Plant, Rosvertol, Gidromash . The controlling state block of shares was retained only in seven joint-stock companies, or in 3% of the newly formed ones. With the consolidation of a blocking stake in federal ownership (25.5% plus 1 share), 87 enterprises (39%) were corporatized, less than 25.5% of shares - 20 enterprises (9%), "golden share" - 16 enterprises (7% ).

Decisions on the corporatization scheme were often the result of discussions between the liberal State Property Committee and the conservative State Committee for Defense Industry, which were not always amenable to logical explanation. So, the reasons why the Yakovlev Design Bureau was corporatized without state participation, the Tupolev Design Bureau - with a state share of less than 50%, the Sukhoi Design Bureau - with the state retaining a controlling stake, and the Mikoyan Design Bureau remained completely in state ownership are not fully understood.

Ownership relations in the aircraft industry proved to be very unstable. Shortly after the initial distribution of shares, the buying and resale of non-state blocks began. So, in the Sukhoi Design Bureau, during the initial distribution of shares, a package of 50% minus 1 share was sold to employees of the enterprise at a nominal value. By 1997, ONEXIMbank and Inkombank bought out approximately 40% of the shares from the non-state stake from members of the labor collective.

Others also bought stakes in aircraft manufacturing enterprises commercial structures, sometimes with not quite transparent goals. In October 1993, several Russian citizens and immigrants from Russia registered Nick & C Corp. in San Francisco, which in 1994-1995 bought up stakes in about 20 aviation industry enterprises, first at voucher auctions, and then from members of labor collectives. Among these enterprises were such large open joint-stock companies as the Moscow scientific and industrial complex Avionika, Tushinsky machine building plant, "Pribor" and VASO. Shares under commission agreements were bought up by intermediary firms and transferred to this company. The Ministry of Defense Industry (then the state agency for managing the aviation industry) and the management of the enterprises themselves questioned the legality of the transactions, which led to conflicts and litigation. The Moscow Arbitration Court and the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District confirmed the legitimacy of transactions with VASO shares. However, in December 1997, the Supreme Arbitration Court, having considered the protest of the Deputy Attorney General, ruled that the transactions for the purchase and sale of VASO shares were invalid and ordered Nick & C Corp. to return the shares to the Russian Federal Property Fund, and RFBR - to pay her the cost of the package in the amount of 365 million rubles.

The report of the Accounts Chamber noted that the imperfection of the legislation created conditions for large-scale buying up by foreign firms (including direct competitors) of shares in aviation industry enterprises: Tupolev ASTC - 26.7% of shares, Aviastar - 35%, Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant - 41 .3%, Perm Motors - 13.2%, VASO - 23.3%, Signal - 35.7%, Rosvertol - 37.1%. The above facts provoked a response from the influential lobby of "statists", at the insistence of which the Law "On state regulation Development of Aviation” of January 8, 1998 No. 10-FZ, which limited the participation of foreigners in the share capital of aircraft manufacturing enterprises to the level of 25% minus 1 share and allowed only citizens of the Russian Federation to enter the management bodies.

However, it was not the number of privatized enterprises, not the depth of privatization, and not the composition of new owners that became the main result of the privatization of aviation industry enterprises in the early 1990s, but the weakening and even liquidation of formal and informal associations of design bureaus and manufacturing enterprises that developed and produced aircraft of a certain brand. Privately privatized design bureaus and manufacturing enterprises acquired different owners, whose motivations often did not coincide with asset and business development plans. Relations between the Yakovlev Design Bureau and the Saratov Aviation Plant, the Sukhoi Design Bureau and the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, the Tupolev Design Bureau and factories in Ulyanovsk and Kazan, the Mikoyan Design Bureau and the Nizhny Novgorod Sokol plant can be cited as examples of weakened or destroyed ties as a result of separate privatization.

Joint ventures. The Russian aviation industry opened up to extensive contacts with foreign firms already in the late 1980s, and in the early 1990s there was a boom in the creation of joint ventures (JV). The reasons for this are easier to understand when viewed through the prism of the plans and expectations of the JV partners.

The interest of Russian participants was explained by the difficult situation that developed in the industry in the early 1990s as a result of a sharp reduction in defense orders, a drop in demand for civilian products, a crisis of non-payments, including for products for government needs, as well as depreciation working capital in conditions of high inflation. Enterprises were in dire need of investment and distribution channels. They hoped that the JV would help attract foreign investment and provide access to world markets. With this in mind, for example, Rybinsk Motors created in 1996 a joint venture with the engine building department of General Electric to produce units for the CFM-56 aircraft engine, one of the most in demand on the world market, in Rybinsk. Investments and sales of products were to become the responsibility of the American partner.

Russian participants were also attracted by Western technologies. By this time, it became obvious that ensuring that new Russian aircraft and helicopters being put into operation meet the high requirements for reliability, economy, comfort and environmental friendliness is necessary condition preservation of the domestic market for the Russian aviation industry, not to mention the external one. The use of Western technology seemed to be the clearest way to fulfill these requirements, allowing for better consumer properties domestic technology, to strengthen it competitive advantages. Therefore, around the Tu-204 project, which was considered the most promising in the first half of the 1990s, about 10 joint ventures were created, which were supposed to improve the consumer properties of the aircraft by introducing Western technologies into the design of various components and systems - from brakes (Russian-American JV "Rubiks") to the interior of the cabin (Russian-British JV "AVINTKO").

The desire of the leaders of Russian aircraft manufacturing enterprises to organize joint ventures controlled by them was also due to the fact that they negatively assessed the activities of foreign economic intermediaries, believed that they did not know the world market for aviation products well enough and were not interested in selling them at a profit for the manufacturer. Having organized a joint venture, they hoped, with the help of a Western partner, to more easily enter the world markets for products, technologies and services. For example, the All-Russian Institute of Aviation Materials (VIAM) created three joint ventures there to promote its products and technologies in the United States.

And Western firms were attracted to Russia by a capacious and previously almost closed sales market for them. In the early 1990s, it seemed that Russian market aircraft and air transportation in the near future will emerge from the crisis and will develop rapidly. Large Western firms sought to gain a foothold in it, the organization of the joint venture was considered very promising in the face of the reciprocal desire of Russian enterprises to cooperate and the declarations of the Russian government to support projects of defense enterprises with potential foreign partners.

In addition, some Western countries expressed their intention to allocate significant financial resources to promote conversion in Russia, which were to be used to support joint projects of defense enterprises and their Western partners. Funds for these purposes, although not in the originally planned amounts, were allocated within the framework of government and interstate programs (the Nunn-Lugar program in the USA, the Western European TACIS program, etc.). This encouraged Western companies to participate in conversion assistance programs in Russia. They were also interested in technologies previously closed to the outside world, accumulated by the Russian aviation industry over the long years of its isolated development, as well as scientific and engineering personnel of aviation enterprises. Access to them, facilitated by the crisis state of the industry, was considered by foreign companies as a way to gain competitive advantages.

That is, the initial expectations of both parties from the implementation joint programs and projects did not quite match. Perhaps that is why, after the increased activity of the early 1990s in the creation of joint ventures, a period of awareness of market and economic realities began. Most of the joint ventures created without a deep study of the economic feasibility of this step and an adequate forecast of the development of business conditions in Russia ceased to exist.

In 1998, a new stage began in the history of the few surviving aircraft-building joint ventures. They found themselves in a new legal situation due to the fact that the Law “On State Regulation of Aviation Development” came into force, according to which, as already mentioned, the share of foreign participants in the share capital of an aviation organization could not exceed the level of 25% minus 1 share and foreign citizens could not enter into its governing bodies. In May 2002, this prohibition in a more stringent formulation was duplicated in the Regulation on Licensing Activities for the Development, Production, Repair and Testing of Aviation Equipment. The developers of these documents sought to prevent hostile buying of large blocks of shares in aviation industry enterprises, but by not singling out the category of joint ventures created to implement joint projects, they de facto put a barrier to their existence.

The inability to have even a blocking stake in the share capital of a joint venture and the ban on representation in its management bodies categorically did not suit foreign participants in aircraft manufacturing alliances, which led to the closure of the joint venture. So, for example, the Russian-Western European joint venture Euromile, founded in 1994 to create a medium transport helicopter Mi-38 with foreign equipment, ceased its activities. In this closed joint-stock company, the Moscow Helicopter Plant named after M. L. Mil, the Kazan Helicopter Plant and the Western European helicopter company Eurocopter had equal shares. When Eurocopter was asked in 1998 to reduce its stake in authorized capital from 33 to 25% minus 1 share and withdraw its representatives from the management bodies, she did not agree and withdrew from the shareholders of the joint venture.

The surviving international alliances were forced to resort to subterfuge or to prove the incompetence of the requirements of this law in relation to joint ventures created before its adoption. One of them was the joint venture "Science - Hamilton Standart", successfully functioning to this day. It was created to provide civil aircraft manufacturers with heat exchangers for air conditioning systems in Russia, but managed to restructure the sales system in such a way that it became a supplier of heat exchangers for all the world's largest aircraft manufacturers (Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, Bombardier). The ban on the creation of a joint venture with a foreign stake larger than the blocking one was lifted only in 2008.

Structural transformations

The 1990s are characterized by two opposite vectors of structural transformations - disintegration and the creation of integrated structures.

Disintegration. The disintegration of the aircraft industry complex was facilitated by privatization, during which design bureaus, assembly plants and main suppliers of components were corporatized separately. In addition, subsidiaries continued to be created around the main enterprises, using the resources of the parent company. A typical example is Sukhoi Advanced Technologies JSC (PTS), later - Aircraft Building Advanced Technologies CJSC. The company was formed in the early 1990s to spin off the Su-26, Su-29 and Su-31 light sport aircraft business. The Sukhoi Design Bureau and PTS JSC were in close contact. The subsidiary was actually managed by the General Director of the OKB, being at the same time its main shareholder. The enterprise was located in the same building as the head design bureau, aircraft were assembled at the pilot production of the design bureau, and design documentation for sports aircraft was transferred from the parent design bureau to a subsidiary by order of the general director. Another example: a subsidiary was formed at the Tupolev Design Bureau, which, for a fee, extended the life of the Tu-154 aircraft, which were in operation around the world in many.

The fact that disintegration does not make it possible to ensure the competitiveness of the industry became obvious already in the first half of the 1990s. However, mergers and acquisitions, natural in the conditions of a developed market economy, did not occur - the new owners and managers of enterprises were not ready for this. At first, the initiative for integration came from the state administration, but their weakness did not contribute to the speed of integration.

Integration. The realization of the need to organize integrated structures in the industry coincided with the campaign launched in the country to create financial-industrial groups (FIGs). FIGs were considered, among other things, as a tool to overcome the deficit of budget financing of industrial programs and projects through the creation of integrated structures that united industrial enterprises and financial institutions. The creation of FIGs was launched on December 5, 1993 by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the Creation of Financial and Industrial Groups in the Russian Federation” No. 2096. The decree defined the essence and features of FIGs as a set of legal entities that form effective and sustainable cooperation aimed at developing priority areas industrial production. To stimulate the creation of FIGs, the Decree, and then the Law “On Financial and Industrial Groups” of November 30, 1995, promised benefits and preferences to the participants of these associations, which in practice were never provided.

The campaign for the creation of FIGs did not bypass the aviation industry either. By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 18, 1995 No. 496, the FIG "Russian Aviation Consortium" was formed. It united developing and serial aircraft-building complexes (Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex Aviastar and A. N. Tupolev Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex), engine-building enterprises (Perm Motors and Aviadvigatel), aircraft operating companies (Aeroflot and Research and Production Center "Universal") and financial institution(Promstroybank). The share of each participant in the authorized capital was 15%, and only Promstroibank - 10%. The goal was to create and market, with the assistance of Aeroflot as a launch customer, new generation aircraft Tu-204, Tu-334, Tu-330, Tu-230. It was planned to equip them with engines, mainly created by the Perm Engine Building Complex.

However, the artificiality of such an association soon became clear. Aeroflot left the FIG, central bank canceled the license of Promstroibank, and the enterprises realized the ephemeral nature of plans to receive extra-budgetary financing in an amount sufficient to accelerate the refinement of existing and development of new aircraft, pre-production, mass production and marketing. In 1996, the FIG, without even partially realizing its plans, was transformed into a rather small joint-stock company.

Despite the fact that superstructural structures such as FIGs did not show viability, the relevance of creating integrated structures did not decrease; on the contrary, it increased over time. The third Federal Target Program, developed in 1997, became not just a conversion program, but the "Defense Industry Restructuring and Conversion Program for 1998-2000". In 1998, the government approved the “Concept for the Restructuring of the Russian Aircraft Industry Complex”, which provided for the creation of “no more than five or six” industry corporations based on the results of the restructuring of the industry, formed to promote certain families of aircraft and helicopters to the market. It is curious that in the early version of the Concept it was envisaged the creation of two or three integrated structures, and in the final version (obviously not without the influence of the management of the main enterprises of the industry) there were six of them, the names of which were easily guessed - "Tupolev", "Ilyushin", "Dry" , "Mikoyan", "Mil", "Kamov". The first projects for the creation of integrated structures that appeared after that fit into the framework of just such a concept of forming the structure of the industry.

The results of the Russian aircraft industry by the end of the 1990s can hardly be considered successful. Conversion, privatization, liberalization economic activity, structural transformations did not stop the negative trends that emerged in the late 1980s. The aviation industry, especially in the civilian segment, was in a deep systemic crisis.

According to formal signs, the aviation industry after the start of market reforms was the object of increased attention from government bodies. But the economic policy pursued was neither effective nor realistic. The combination of weak state administration and the influence of the industry lobby reduced it mainly to the adoption of numerous decrees, plans and programs that provided for the continuation of the Soviet practice of state subsidies. Respectively main goal disparate economic entities of the industry was striving to gain access to the subsidized channel of state financing, and not to gain a competitive position in the aviation market. The scarcity of this source and the lack of an effective management policy led to a significant weakening of the industry, even compared to the early 1990s.

However, the possibility of reviving the industry was not irrevocably lost, which in the 2000s provided a certain rise in production and the basis for further reform.

2000s

In the 2000s, the volume of production of the aviation industry began to grow from year to year, which was facilitated by the overall growth of the economy and the associated possibility of increasing budget financing for the industry. The disintegration of aircraft manufacturing enterprises was stopped. The long-awaited unification of industry enterprises led to an increase in the role of the state as the owner of aircraft building assets, which in fact meant a partial renationalization of the industry.

The structure of government departments that managed the enterprises of the industry and their associations, as in the 1990s, continued to change. So, until 2004, the aviation industry was under the control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency. During the administrative reform of 2004, the operational management of the industry was entrusted to the newly formed Federal Agency for Industry - Rosprom, and the development of industrial policy - to the updated Ministry of Industry and Energy of Russia. The artificially formed (at least in terms of aircraft manufacturing) dual power with the actual duplication of managerial functions ended in 2008, when Rosprom was liquidated, and public administration the aircraft building complex was transferred to the reformed Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg of Russia), which included the formation of a specialized Department of the Aviation Industry (as a result of the disaggregation of the Department of Defense Industries).

Production and delivery of aircraft equipment to the market in the 2000s

The positive dynamics of aircraft output, which began after the default of 1998, continued throughout the next decade ( rice. five, the level of production in 1992 in value terms is taken as a reference point). Having started the rise from 23.5% of the production volume in 1992, in 2009 the industry only approached (90.7%) the production level of the first year of economic reforms.

A source: Research Institute of Economics of the Aviation Industry.

Figure 5 Dynamics of the relative change in output in value terms, reduced to comparable prices, 1992 = 100%

The upward trend continued due to the increase in the production of both military and civilian products, although the share of military products prevailed in the structure of production throughout the period under review. Such an output structure was provided mainly due to the export deliveries of military aircraft. Their temporary decline in 2004-2005 immediately caused a decline in the overall dynamics of production, which, however, did not change the generally positive dynamics of the industry's income over the past decade.

The export of military aircraft grew mainly due to the supply of Su-30 front-line aircraft in various modifications. China and India remained their main consumers. But in contrast to the 1990s and earlier, these countries have begun to move from purchasing ready-made aircraft to purchasing technological kits for licensed assembly on their territory. New major importers of finished Su-30 aircraft in the 2000s were Algeria (28 aircraft), Venezuela (24 aircraft) and Malaysia (18 aircraft). Small batches of these aircraft were also ordered by other countries. In some years, production heavy fighters Su-27 and Su-30 reached 50 aircraft per year.

In the early 2000s, exports of MiG-29 fighters resumed (after a pause in the late 1990s). It all started with small shipments to Sudan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Eritrea. In 2004, an important contract was signed with India for the development and production of 16 ship-based MiG-29K aircraft. This contract was part of a wider deal to acquire the modernized aircraft carrier cruiser Admiral Gorshkov (new name Vikramaditya) from Russia. The first flight of the Mig-29K aircraft took place in 2007, its production was organized at a new production site - an aircraft factory in Lukhovitsy near Moscow, counting on continued deliveries to India (to equip an aircraft carrier already built by us) and on the start of deliveries under the state defense order for aviation Navy Russia.

With the export of MiG-29 aircraft, there was a precedent for the return of already delivered aircraft. The contract with Algeria for the supply of 34 MiG-29 fighters was signed in 2006. In 2007, having received the first 15 machines and having discovered the facts of completing the aircraft with used components, Algeria suspended the contract. In 2008, the fighters were returned to Russia. Presumably, the returned aircraft were repaired and entered service with the Air Force.

Another serious failure of the system of export deliveries of military aircraft was the refusal to fulfill the contract for the supply to China of 34 Il-76 heavy military transport aircraft and four tanker aircraft based on them (Il-78), signed in September 2005. Already after the conclusion of the contract by Rosoboronexport, it became clear that the Tashkent plant TAPOiCH, where the aircraft were supposed to be assembled, was not able to fulfill the terms of the contract. This was another reason for making the final decision to transfer the production of the Il-76 aircraft to Ulyanovsk (Aviastar-SP).

The state defense order for the aviation industry was reduced mainly to the modernization of aircraft. As for the supply of newly produced aircraft to equip the Armed Forces, the contracts concluded in the early 2000s began to be implemented only after 2005, and with significant delays. First of all, we are talking about contracts for the supply of Yak-130 combat training aircraft and Su-34 front-line bombers (modification Su-27). The first Su-34 was officially handed over to the Air Force in August 2007. At the end of 2009, 4 Su-34 aircraft participated in flight tests conducted at the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel. By this time, the aircraft had not yet entered the combat units of the Air Force, contrary to previously announced plans. Also, deliveries to the Air Force of serial samples of the Yak-130 aircraft, the first military aircraft fully developed in new Russia(previously, aircraft developed in the Soviet period were modernized).

A radical change in orders for aviation equipment under the state defense order occurred only in the summer of 2009, when at the MAKS-2009 aviation and space show a contract was signed between the Russian Air Force and the Sukhoi company in the amount of more than 80 billion rubles for the supply of 64 front-line fighters (48 - Su-35, 12 - Su-27 SM, 4 - Su-30 M²) .

Two competing helicopter complexes Mil and Kamov entered the 2000s with competing programs for the creation of Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 combat helicopters. In 2003, the Ministry of Defense selected the Mi-28 helicopter for procurement under the state defense order. At the same time, it was decided to purchase a small amount of the Ka-50 Black Shark helicopter and its two-seat modification, the Ka-52 Alligator. Large-scale public procurement of combat helicopters until 2009 did not begin. Export deliveries of military helicopters are provided mainly through the production of modified versions of helicopters of previous generations - the Mi-8 (in the export designation Mi-17), as well as the Mi-24 and its modern modification Mi-35.

The production of civil helicopters for 1999-2009 increased 3 times - from 40 to 124 ( rice. 6). And in the production of civil aircraft, the expected turning point did not happen, they were still produced in single copies. But the reasons have changed (recall: in the 1990s, this was due to the redundancy of the fleet of Russian airlines, which arose as a result of a sharp reduction in air travel and a large-scale return of Soviet-made aircraft to the country). In the 2000s, the domestic market for passenger air transportation, which was primarily expected by manufacturers of domestic aircraft, did not decline, but grew - on average, about 11% per year, which significantly exceeded the average rate of development of the world market. Air transportation by Russian airlines grew 2.5 times in 2000-2008 - from just over 20 million to almost 50 million passengers a year ( rice. 7).

A source: Research Institute of Economics of the Aviation Industry, Interdepartmental Analytical Center.

Figure 6 Production of civil aircraft (without light ones) and helicopters in 1999-2009, pieces

A source: Transport Clearing House.

Figure 7 Dynamics of passenger air transportation in Russia in 1998-2008, million people

But the domestic aviation industry failed to take advantage of this window of opportunity. She lost the domestic market to foreign manufacturers - mainly Boeing and Airbus. In 2000-2008, about 280 foreign-made mainline passenger aircraft were supplied to Russian airlines at an ever-increasing annual rate ( rice. 8). At the same time, the aircraft industry did not receive offset compensation (very common in world practice) in the form of loading national aircraft manufacturing capacities in exchange for a concession to the domestic market.

A source: State Research Institute of Civil Aviation.

Figure 8 Dynamics of deliveries of foreign-made long-haul aircraft to Russian airlines, pieces

The state still played a significant role in providing orders for even a small (single) production of civil aircraft. So, out of eight Il-96 aircraft produced and delivered in 2000-2009, three were delivered to the special flight squad "Russia" under the state order of the presidential administration, the production of three more aircraft for Cuba was financed from a syndicated loan, in essence, state-owned banks (Vneshtorgbank, Vnesheconombank and Roseximbank), backed by 100% government guarantees. In 2004, the delivery of two Il-96 aircraft to KrasAir under a leasing scheme took place only thanks to the filling of the lessor's authorized capital (Ilyushin Finance Co) from budgetary funds and partial compensation (also from the budget) of lease payments from the lessee.

Similar state support was provided for the promotion of the Tu-204/214 family aircraft to the market. The production of Tu-214 aircraft in Kazan was partially provided by orders from the presidential administration - first aircraft in passenger modification, and then special aircraft on the Tu-214 platform. Since 2007, deliveries to Cuba of Tu-204 aircraft manufactured in Ulyanovsk in cargo and passenger modifications began, the production of which was financed according to a scheme worked out in a deal with Il-96 aircraft.

Deliveries of Tu-204 aircraft to Cuba somewhat revived the final production at the Ulyanovsk Aviastar-SP. However, not Cuban, but domestic orders, placed under the scheme of state-supported leasing, have become decisive in the production of Tu-204 aircraft in the past decade. Small batches of Tu-204 aircraft were delivered to Vladivostok-Avia (six aircraft in a shortened version of Tu-204-300), as well as to the Russian charter airline Red Wings (eight aircraft in the Tu-204-100V modification). It was this airline that in 2009 made public and initiated a public discussion of the problems of reliability of Tu-204 aircraft and the low level of their after-sales service.

In 2008, a notable event took place: a cargo aircraft of the Tu-204/214 family, equipped with Rolls-Royce engines, Honeywell avionics and an “English” cabin (modification Tu-204-120CE), was certified according to the standards of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) . The certification process has been dragging on since 1998. Obtaining a European certificate made it possible to deliver the first aircraft in the Tu-204-120CE modification to China, since the presence of such a certificate was mandatory requirement Chinese customer, which in 2001 placed an order for five such aircraft (plus an option for another 10 aircraft). As of the end of 2009, the operation of the aircraft was not started due to the customer's claims to the aircraft and its after-sales service system. Accordingly, the delivery of other aircraft ordered by China was delayed.

It should be noted that this was already the second attempt to organize export deliveries of Tu-204 aircraft with foreign engines and avionics (Tu-204-120 modification). Prior to this, five such aircraft had already been delivered to Egypt in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But this transaction went beyond the normal business activities. It was organized and conducted by a prominent Egyptian businessman Ibrahim Kamal and Sirocco Aerospace Int, a leasing company he created. Sirocco financed the completion of the aircraft from the reserve created at the Ulyanovsk plant in Soviet time, the supply of foreign components, the certification of the modification according to Russian airworthiness standards and the work to recognize these standards in Egypt, the organization of the Air Cairo airline, to which the aircraft were delivered, as well as the maintenance of Russian crews and technicians in Egypt. And even paid off the debts of the Ulyanovsk plant for utility bills. All this was done in exchange for exclusive rights granted to her. Russian government, to promote Tu-204 aircraft in foreign configuration on the world market. The Sirocco company counted on the massive demand for these aircraft, but its hopes did not materialize. At the end of 2009, China was the only customer for the Tu-204-120 modification. Since the middle of the decade, the prospects for promoting the Tu-204 / 214 family aircraft to the market have been associated with a new modification of the Tu-204 SM, in which the main innovation is the PS-90A2 engine, modernized as part of a joint project of the Perm Engine Building Complex and the American company Pratt & Whitney. The engine was certified in December 2009 .

Noteworthy is the deployment at two production sites in Russia of licensed production and deliveries to the domestic market of aircraft developed in Ukraine (Antonov ASTC). One of the assembly sites was the Samara Aviation Plant Aviakor, which, after many years of organization of production, began a single production of the An-140 turboprop passenger aircraft. In 2006-2009, Yakutia Airlines, through the mediation of the Financial Leasing Company, delivered the first three production aircraft.

Another site was organized in Voronezh at the facilities of VASO, where the production of the An-148 regional jet aircraft began. The first two aircraft were delivered to the Rossiya State Transport Company in 2009 through the leasing company Ilyushin Finance Co. This fact deserves attention, if only because its An-148 deliveries began earlier than deliveries of another regional aircraft SSJ-100, which is the product of the most ambitious civil aircraft building project in post-Soviet Russia.

The small number of civil aircraft produced and delivered to the domestic market in the 2000s also included aircraft of the old generation. Thus, in 2000-2007, Samara Aviakor assembled and delivered four Tu-154M aircraft to customers, and in 2000-2004 the Saratov Aviation Plant - five Yak-42 aircraft. In addition, in 2000-2008, about 100 passenger aircraft of the previous generation, which were abandoned by foreign airlines, were reimported to Russia.

Thus, the breakthrough of Russian civil aircraft manufacturers to the domestic and world markets, which was expected in the 1990s, has not yet taken place. It became obvious that the aircraft developed in the 1980s (primarily the Tu-204/214, Il-96) could not ensure the achievement of the strategic goals of the development of the domestic aviation industry. Therefore, in the 2000s, projects and programs were launched aimed at creating products that would better meet the modern requirements of the global civil aviation market.

Programs and projects for the creation and promotion of advanced aircraft on the market

In 2004, as part of a discussion about using the Stabilization Fund to increase budget funding for the real sector of the economy, the government launched a campaign to develop sectoral strategies. Industries that would present coherent development strategies within the popular at that time paradigm of “public-private partnership” could apply for an increase in budget funding. The aviation industry has also joined the campaign. By the end of the year, the "Strategy for the development of the aviation industry until 2015" was developed, which, after discussions and approvals at meetings of the government and the State Council, was approved on April 20, 2006 by order of the Minister of Industry and Energy. The strategy determined the product policy of the industry for the medium term and outlined the directions of its structural transformations. In the product part, the Strategy mainly provided for the continuation of previously launched programs and projects, in the structural part - the creation of integrated structures in the aircraft building sub-sectors, primarily in aircraft building, helicopter building and engine building. As expected, the adoption of the Strategy helped to increase budget funding for sectoral programs.

In the military segment The main program in the 2000s was the development of a new (fifth) generation fighter, usually called the Advanced Frontline Aviation Complex (PAK FA). Work on its creation was carried out earlier, but the experimental aircraft built at the Mikoyan Design Bureau (MiG 1.44) and the Sukhoi Design Bureau (Su-47 Berkut) became more “technology demonstrators” than prototypes of new generation combat vehicles. Both design bureaus claimed further funding for their work, but the victory in the competition for the creation of the PAK FA, held by the Ministry of Defense in 2002, was won by the Sukhoi aircraft building complex. The PAK FA project turned out to be perhaps the largest project of the Russian aviation industry in terms of funding in the 2000s, at least in its military segment.

In parallel with the development of this aircraft, the Sukhoi Design Bureau was engaged in a deep modernization of its main Su-27 combat vehicle, creating the Su-34 front-line bomber and the Su-35 multifunctional fighter. The latter is considered a 4++ generation aircraft, that is, a transitional aircraft between fourth and fifth generation fighters. Flight tests of the Su-35 fighter began in February 2008.

Noteworthy are projects aimed at reviving national independence in the creation of military transport aircraft. The Ilyushin aircraft building complex became the leader in the country in terms of military transport, carried out programs for the creation of light and medium military transport aircraft, organized the transfer to Russia of the production of the heavy military transport aircraft Il-76 with the simultaneous modernization of the technical person of this aircraft.

Of particular interest is the project to create a multi-purpose transport aircraft (MTS), since it is being implemented in cooperation with India. This is the first attempt to organize a military-technical cooperation project in which Russia is not an exporter of weapons or military R&D results, but acts as a partner in international cooperation in the development, production and marketing of a jointly created military aircraft. In 1998, the Indian government chose the Ilyushin Aircraft Building Complex as a partner of the national aircraft building corporation Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) to implement a joint project based on the then initial stage preliminary design of the Il-214 medium military transport aircraft. The Russian side, in assuming the obligation to participate in a joint full-cycle project and finance it in equal shares with the Indian side, took certain political, legal and financial risks. First, there was no regulatory and legislative support for the implementation of joint full-cycle military-technical projects. Secondly, the State Armaments Program did not provide for the development of such a medium military transport aircraft, so it was necessary to attract extra-budgetary funds, which created a precedent in the creation of weapons and military equipment.

In 2000, the private corporation Irkut decided to join the project as a co-investor and co-developer, seeking to create a strategic alliance with the HAL Corporation, a key player in the booming market of the Asia-Pacific region. The alliance was to be based on the successful Su-30MKI project, developed within the framework of the MTS project, which could be followed by entry into each other's equity capital.

The Irkut Corporation proposed a kind of compromise to the government. It finances the Russian share of the MTS project (no money was provided in the budget for its implementation) and provides a design base to support the weakening design potential of the Ilyushin complex. To do this, the corporation absorbed the private design bureau Aviastep, turning it into its subsidiary Irkut-Aviastep. And after the corporation acquired the private Yakovlev Design Bureau, its design capacities began to be used in the MTS project.

In return, the government was required to provide state support for the initiative of the Irkut Corporation, which consisted in the rejection of some dogmas of the system of military-technical cooperation. It was proposed, firstly, to lift the ban on conducting all types of military-technical cooperation by enterprises with a state share in the share capital structure of less than 51% (in fact, on the participation of private capital in the implementation of such projects), secondly, to abandon the mediation of Rosoboronexport, thirdly, to obtain legally binding obligations from the Ministry of Defense to purchase a certain batch of MTS aircraft in the event that the terms of reference issued by it are fulfilled (it is necessary to obtain a loan on acceptable terms); its own or borrowed funds.

In March 2004, decrees of the president and the government were issued, in which the most pressing questions raised by the Irkut corporation were not taken into account. In 2005, the corporation withdrew from the MTS project. The Russian side lost the source of financing for the project, the cost of which by that time was estimated at $600 million.

It took two years to find a way out of the current situation and agree with the Indian side on the solution found: “the Russian side is financing the project at the expense of repaying the Indian debt to the Russian Federation,” which was recorded in the intergovernmental agreement signed in November 2007. But when discussing the budget for 2009, it turned out that, firstly, it is not clear how these budget revenues (repayment of the state debt) can be converted into budget expenditures (R & D financing), and secondly, an interdepartmental discussion has unfolded about the financing scheme for the Russian participants in the MTS project.

In the civil segment the continuation of the "Program for the development of civil aviation technology in Russia until 2000" was the Federal target program "Development of civil aviation technology in Russia for 2002-2010 and for the period up to 2015". From its predecessor, it inherited the ambitious goal of creating competitive aviation equipment for deliveries to domestic and foreign markets, the multiplicity of projects included in it and optimism regarding the growth of the domestic aircraft sales market. The new program includes 25 projects for the creation and modernization of aviation equipment (16 aircraft and 9 helicopters), 27 engine building projects and about 20 projects for the creation of on-board radio-electronic equipment, an extensive list of measures for the technical re-equipment and development of production, according to promising R&D. In the period up to 2015, it was planned to ensure sales of domestic civil aviation equipment in Russia and for export in the amount of about 1 trillion rubles. To do this, according to the Program, Russian airlines were to purchase 1,400 aircraft and 1,150 helicopters, and the total production, taking into account state needs and export deliveries, was 2,800 aircraft and 2,200 helicopters.

A new aspect of the FTP was the fact that for several aircraft development projects included in it, the developers (recipients of budgetary funds) were not determined a priori and had to be selected by competition. In mid-2002, Rosaviakosmos announced competitions for the creation of two new aircraft - regional and short-medium haul (BSMS).

The announcement of a competition for the development of a new regional aircraft, strictly speaking, contradicted the original version of the Program, according to which the competition was to be announced only in 2005 after the certification of the Tu-324 small regional aircraft, which was under development at that time, which was already discussed. However, despite the negative reaction of the authorities of Tatarstan, who participated in the financing of the Tu-324 project, and supporters of the "Tupolev" product line (Tu-324, Tu-334, Tu-204 / 214) as the main line for the development of the civil aircraft model range in Russia, competition took place. The victory in it, as expected, was won by the project to create an RRJ aircraft of the Sukhoi aircraft building complex. The Ilyushin aircraft building complex was also declared as a participant in the project in the bid, probably to give it additional weight.

The competition for the creation of BSMS was won by a joint project of the Yakovlev Design Bureau and AK Ilyushin, based on the project for the development of the Yak-242 aircraft as a development of the Yak-42 family. Subsequently, the Ilyushin aircraft building complex was excluded from the participants in both projects, which some time later received the names SSJ-100 and MS-21 and became the main civilian projects of the first decade of the 2000s.

The fact that the SSJ-100 and MS-21 projects became the main ones by the end of the decade did not happen right away. In 2002, the project to complete the development of the Tu-334 aircraft received absolute priority in terms of funding. This project, unlike previous years, was financed in the planned amount. However, the increase in budget support did not lead to the deployment of serial production of this aircraft, as has already been said.

The gradual redistribution of budgetary funding under the FTP in favor of new projects was not balanced. As the program continued and as a result of its several adjustments, including to bring it in line with the industry strategy adopted in 2006, the absolute priority of state support was given to the SSJ-100 project, which was implemented in broad international cooperation.

The concept of creating a regional aircraft in Russia with the participation of foreign partners has been discussed at the Sukhoi aircraft building complex since the late 1990s. Initially, the project was planned to be implemented jointly with the American company Alliance Aircraft Corp., created by immigrants from McDonald Douglas, which was recently acquired by Boeing. In the spring of 2000, at the Berlin Air Show ILA-2000, Alliance Aircraft and the Sukhoi Design Bureau signed an agreement to jointly develop, manufacture and market a regional aircraft, called the Starliner. To implement the project, a subsidiary company Sukhoi Civil Aircraft (SCA) was created at the Sukhoi Design Bureau. But already in the fall of 2000, the Sukhoi Design Bureau announced its withdrawal from the joint project due to the insignificant role that the American company assigned to it in the plans for the joint creation of the aircraft.

Soon, the Sukhoi Design Bureau agreed to participate in the regional aircraft project with Boeing, but a different model of cooperation was chosen. The project, named RRJ, did not have the status of a joint international project. The GSS company became its system integrator, and the venerable American partner took over only the provision of consulting services in the field of marketing, design, production and certification of the aircraft, work with system suppliers and after-sales support. The importance of consulting support was determined by the fact that the RRJ (after the name change - SSJ-100) became the first aircraft in the history of the Russian civil aviation industry, the design of which was carried out in international cooperation with future aircraft systems suppliers. In addition, during the design process, numerous consultations were held with potential customers of the aircraft.

Since November 2003, an advisory council of domestic and foreign air carriers and leasing companies began to work, which clarified market requirements for the aircraft. In September 2004, the GSS company applied for participation in the Aeroflot tender for the supply of a regional aircraft, which it subsequently won.

In parallel with the design work, technological re-equipment of aircraft manufacturers was carried out (primarily KnAPO). The first sample of the SSJ-100 aircraft, intended for static testing, was manufactured in 2006, at the beginning of 2007 it was already tested at TsAGI under the certification program. The first flight model participated in the roll-out ceremony in September 2007, and in May 2008 its first flight took place.

The volume of budgetary financing of the project under the FTP, which has been carried out since 2003, could not, and should not have covered all the costs of developing the aircraft. The SSJ project management managed to organize an unprecedented for Russia set of tools for financing the development and technological preparation for the production of the SSJ-100 aircraft. In addition to direct government funding for R&D, we managed to use a risk-shared partnership with PowerJet, a developer and supplier of aircraft engines, loans from Russian banks (VEB, VTB, Sberbank), including using the mechanism of state guarantees, credit lines from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Eurasian Development Bank, bond issue, investment in the authorized capital of the GSS company. The last instrument of financing was the result of the Italian company Alenia Aeronautica joining the project as a strategic partner. This became possible after the abolition of the 25% tax rate that existed since 1998. legal restriction for the participation of foreign investors in the equity capital of an aviation industry enterprise. To make such a decision, the personal participation of the leaders of Russia and Italy was required.

The SSJ-100 project has also become unprecedented in terms of the scale of international cooperation. About 40 suppliers of systems, components and assemblies from ten countries of the world became its participants.

At the turn of the decade, there was a delay of two or three years from the originally announced dates for the start of commercial sales. At the end of 2009, three prototype flight prototypes of the aircraft were still flying under the certification program. Delivery to the airline, as envisaged by the FTP, did not start. Despite this, it should be noted that the SSJ-100 project has already brought the civil segment of the Russian aviation industry to a new qualitative stage of development.

Outside of the Federal Target Program, the decade was marked by the start of the use of two new state assistance instruments promotion of new civil aircraft of domestic production on the domestic market - increasing the share capital of aviation leasing companies and subsidizing the interest rate of bank loans attracted by aviation and leasing companies for the purchase of domestic aircraft.

To stimulate aviation leasing, the government provided in the federal budgets for 2001 and 2002 the allocation of funding in the amount of the equivalent of $132.6 million to revitalize the activities of aviation leasing companies. In mid-2001, the Ministry of Economic Development held a competition to select investment projects for aircraft leasing and leasing companies. The idea of ​​the competition was that the state would buy a controlling stake in the leasing company that would submit an aircraft leasing project that would best meet predetermined criteria. These included: share own funds the leasing company in the total amount of investments necessary for the implementation of the project, the volume of the manufacturer's repaid debt for mandatory payments to the budgets of all levels, the number of domestically produced aircraft purchased by the leasing company, etc.

Two leasing companies, Ilyushin Finance Co. (IFC) and Financial Leasing Company (FLC), were announced as winners, with approximately the same number of points. IFC received funding in the amount equivalent to $80 million to implement a leasing project for 10 Il-96 aircraft, FLC - $56.2 million to implement a leasing project for 10 Tu-214 aircraft.

The implementation of transactions for the state acquisition of blocks of shares in leasing companies required the re-registration of companies created in the form of closed joint-stock companies into open joint-stock companies, their valuation, additional share issues, the conclusion of agreements with the Ministry of Property for their acquisition, etc. This took the second half of 2001 years and most of 2002.

Meanwhile, new problems arose. The government, trying to bring the Aviastar-SP serial plant out of crisis, the products of which were not initially included in the leasing projects selected at the competition, suggested that IFC include the purchase of Tu-204 aircraft produced at this enterprise in its leasing project. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance was instructed to allocate 1.5 billion rubles from the federal budget to the Ministry of Property for the purchase of an additional issue of shares of IFC. Having received these funds, IFC began a long contractual campaign with potential customers for Tu-204 aircraft. Only at the end of December 2002, IFC transferred the first payment to VASO to pay off the debts of this enterprise, as stipulated by the terms of the tender. And then under severe pressure from the government, which sought to prevent the deployment of a strike by the VASO labor collective in protest against delays in the expected financing of the production of the Il-96 against the backdrop of Aeroflot signing an agreement with Airbus for the supply of a large batch of aircraft of the A320 family.

Government spending to subsidize the interest rate of a bank loan for the purchase of aircraft was first included in the 2001 budget. The Ministry of Transport became the manager of these funds. In the same year, the government determined the procedure for compensating part of the cost of paying interest on loans received to finance the cost of acquiring domestic aircraft. The conclusion of agreements with airlines began at the end of 2001. In June 2002, this budgetary support for airlines was supplemented by the reimbursement of part of the cost of paying lease payments for Russian aircraft. For these purposes, the 2002 federal budget provided for 500 million rubles. Budgetary funds were distributed according to the competition. Until the end of 2002, the Ministry of Transport was developing a regulation on the competition and collecting applications from applicants. The mechanism for subsidizing interest rates and lease payments continues to operate.

Institutional and structural changes

In the early 2000s, two approaches to structural reforms in the aircraft building complex emerged. The carriers of one of them were sectoral government bodies, and the other - private structures that were formed in the industry as a result of institutional and structural reforms of the 1990s and gained political weight by the early 2000s, gained experience in structural transformations and had financial opportunities.

Since 1998, in accordance with the "Concept for the Restructuring of the Russian Aircraft Industry Complex", government bodies have pursued a policy of gradually creating integrated structures within the framework of traditional aircraft building complexes. This policy was also enshrined in the Federal Target Program "Reforming and developing the military-industrial complex (2002-2006)". It planned the creation of integrated aircraft complexes "Tupolev" and "Ilyushin". In the Tupolev complex, the Tupolev Design Bureau (OKB) was to be united with the Ulyanovsk, Kazan, Taganrog and Samara serial plants, and in the Ilyushin aircraft building complex, the Design Bureau with the Voronezh and Tashkent serial plants. Only at the second stage of the implementation of the Program, further mergers were envisaged - the creation of two aircraft and helicopter complexes. One of them (SVSK-1) was planned as part of the Tupolev, MiG and Kamov aircraft building complexes, the other (SVSK-2) - as part of the Ilyushin, Sukhoi and Mil complexes. According to the composition of the participants, the intention of the developers was visible - to create diversified associations competing with each other for the development and production of military and civil aircraft and helicopters.

The experience of the 1990s showed that different categories of owners with different positions and interests on merger issues, different organizational and legal forms of enterprises planned for merger, the weakness and volatility of the public administration system, and the lack of obvious motivations for enterprise managers would make the process of implementing the goals of the FTP endless. This motivated the private owners of aircraft manufacturing assets to take the alternative initiative of creating a united aircraft manufacturing company controlled by private shareholders.

The main initiators were the Irkut corporation, the Kaskol group of companies and the Yakovlev Design Bureau. They were supported by other private structures that had ownership and influence in the aircraft industry - the National Reserve Bank with its subsidiary leasing company Ilyushin Finance Co, the Volga-Dnepr company, private shareholders of Ilyushin JSC.

The government supported this initiative and decided to include state assets in the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) being created. This decision was confirmed in the "Strategy for the development of the aviation industry for the period up to 2015", where one of the most important tasks was the formation of a new organizational structure an industry that involves the elimination of the disunity of aircraft building complexes and the unification of aircraft building assets and businesses in a limited number large companies(aircraft building, helicopter building, engine building, etc.), capable of pursuing a policy of creating and promoting competitive products on the markets.

The process of creating the UAC was not fast. The concept was being coordinated, the “interested departments” presented their conclusions ... Meanwhile, the actual merger continued, in February 2005, the heads of Sukhoi, MiG, Irkut, Ilyushin, Yakovlev, Ilyushin Finance Co and "Financial Leasing Company" signed an agreement on the formation of a consortium of enterprises of the aircraft building complex. The consortium (non-commercial partnership) formed a management company to prepare the creation of the holding. The preparatory work carried out by her made it possible to sign on February 20, 2006 the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the open joint-stock company United Aircraft Corporation” No. 140, according to which the consolidation of aircraft manufacturing assets was to take place in two stages.

At the first stage, the authorized capital of the UAC provided for the introduction, as a contribution of the Russian Federation, of state blocks of shares in the Sukhoi aviation holding company and the KnAPO and NAPO plants included in this holding, joint-stock company"Tupolev", the interstate aircraft building company "Ilyushin", the Nizhny Novgorod aircraft building plant "Sokol", the leasing companies IFC and FLC, the foreign trade association "Aviaexport". A closed list of joint-stock companies was also determined, whose shares could be contributed to the authorized capital of UAC as a contribution of non-state shareholders. In part, these were the same companies, and in part the shares of key aircraft manufacturing enterprises, in the share capital structure of which there were no state-owned stakes (Irkut, Yakovlev Design Bureau, Sukhoi Design Bureau, Beriev Design Bureau, Aviastar-SP and VASO plants, etc.).

At the second stage, the Decree ordered the corporatization of federal state unitary enterprises RAC "MiG" and KAPO named after Gorbunov, with the subsequent contribution of 100% of the shares of each of them to the authorized capital of UAC in the order of payment by the state for an additional issue.

According to the Decree, the share of the state in the authorized capital of UAC could not be less than 75%. Hopes for a more balanced public-private partnership did not materialize. In practice, the share of the state, even before the corporatization of federal state unitary enterprises and the introduction of their state stakes in the authorized capital, exceeded 90%.

For operational management United enterprises within the UAC, according to the concept of its creation, created business units according to the areas of activity. Their composition was revised several times, and on November 19, 2009, the UAC Board of Directors made the final decision to form three business units: UAC-Combat Aircraft, UAC-Commercial Aircraft and UAC-Special Aircraft.

Similar integration processes took place in other sub-sectors. So, in December 2006, JSC Russian Helicopters was formed, which included Mil Design Bureau, Kamov Design Bureau, Kazan Helicopter Plant, Rosvertol, Kumertau Aviation Production Association, Arsenyev Aviation Company Progress, etc. In April 2008, the the United Engine Corporation was formed, which included the Rybinsk NPO Saturn, engine-building design bureaus and factories in Perm, Samara, Ufa, etc. The Tactical Missiles Corporation was created on the basis of aviation industry enterprises specializing in the field of aviation weapons. And the state corporation "Russian Technologies" forms instrument-making holdings on the basis of aircraft instrument manufacturing and aircraft assembly enterprises.

In conclusion, we note that over the first decade of the 2000s, the face of the aviation industry has changed significantly. Scattered enterprises were assembled into large branch corporations, and state ownership became absolutely predominant. The budget financing of projects and programs of the aircraft industry has increased many times over. The dynamics of the production of aircraft and especially helicopters has become positive. Despite the fact that the emerging integrated structures have not yet become full-fledged corporations, and the long cycles of development and preparation for the production of aviation equipment have not yet ended with the introduction of new generation products to the market, the degradation of the industry has been stopped. Whether the transformation of the aviation industry into a globally competitive industry will follow, the next decade will show.

The breadth of the range of state support measures can be judged from paragraph 3 of Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated July 2, 1996 No. 786: Agree with the proposal supported by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to buy out Nigerian debt on agreed terms and send part of these funds for sale program for the production of civil aircraft of the joint-stock company Aviastar (item not implemented).

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On additional measures for state support of civil aviation in Russia" dated July 7, 1998 No. 716.

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On some issues of regulating the temporary import of foreign-made aviation equipment" dated August 2, 2001 No. 574.

Report of the Accounts Chamber "On the results of a thematic audit of the legality of privatization, management efficiency and state support for aviation industry enterprises in the post-privatization period of 1992-1999" // Bulletin of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation. 2000. No. 8 (32). pp. 215-232.

Evaluation of the IFK company by a foreign auditor after the tender showed that the funds allocated by the state are enough to buy out only a 38% stake in its shares, and not a controlling stake, as was stipulated by the terms of the tender.

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On measures of state support for the renewal of the fleet of sea, river, aircraft and their construction" dated April 9, 2001 No. 278.

Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On the procedure for reimbursement to Russian airlines of part of the costs of paying lease payments for aircraft Russian production, received by them from Russian leasing companies under leasing agreements, as well as part of the cost of paying interest on loans received in 2002 from Russian credit institutions for the purchase of Russian aircraft” dated June 26, 2002 No. 466.

JSC Russian Helicopters was established as a 100% subsidiary of the United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On further development Open Joint Stock Company United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom dated April 16, 2008 No. 497.

The aviation industry is one of the branches of engineering, engaged in the production of both the aircraft themselves and all the parts and equipment necessary for them.

The origin of the aviation industry in Russia

Speaking about the aviation industry of the USSR, it is impossible not to mention its origins, dating back to the first decade of the 20th century. The first aircraft produced by the aviation industry were airships. Gradually, aircraft and aircraft engines began to be manufactured in small quantities.

But the development of the aviation industry in the Russian Empire progressed at a slow pace. There were only a few small factories and workshops that were directly involved in the manufacture of aircraft. The development of the aviation industry was negatively affected by the need to purchase many parts abroad (especially expensive aircraft engines) and a weak material part.

Only with the outbreak of the First World War in this industry there has been progress. An order was received from the military department for the production of a large batch of aircraft. But, despite some improvements in the aviation industry, this industry was not going through better times and far behind many European countries.
This situation continued until the October Revolution and the coming of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia.

The aviation industry of the USSR as an independent industry was formed in early 1937. It was withdrawn from the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was part of it as one of the departments, and transformed into an independent People's Commissariat of the USSR aviation industry.

For several pre-war years, mass production of various types of aircraft and all the parts necessary for them was organized. great attention devoted to research and development work. New types of aircraft, aircraft engines, etc. were developed and tested. Particular attention was paid to the quality and reliability of aircraft, their flight characteristics and weapons.

The aviation industry of the USSR in the prewar years experienced a great need both for experienced specialists and for the necessary components and materials, for example, aluminum. However, it was still possible to establish mass production of aircraft. A considerable part of the parts for aircraft still had to be bought abroad.

War years

The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War made significant adjustments to the work of the aviation industry of the USSR. Part of the aviation enterprises were evacuated inland, new factories were created. The mass production of aircraft began. Despite the difficult situation, the aviation industry was able in record time to increase the number of aircraft produced so much that the backlog in combat aviation from the Nazi German Air Force was eliminated. The production of new types of aircraft, developed taking into account the combat experience of Soviet aviation, was created and began in a short time.

By the end of the war, the aviation industry of the USSR was the most powerful in Europe. Produced aircraft were in no way inferior (and in many ways superior) to their foreign counterparts. The Soviet aviation industry, with its hard work, made a huge contribution to the victory over the enemy. Many aviation enterprises were awarded orders for labor achievements.

Postwar years

In 1946, the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR, like all other People's Commissariats, was transformed into a Ministry.

After the war, it became clear that the future of aviation lay with jet engines. Within a few years, the first Soviet combat jet aircraft were created, tested and mass-produced. Huge scientific and design work was carried out to create not only the flying vehicles themselves, but also all their components.

The aviation industry of the USSR in the post-war years was second only to the US aviation industry. This is due to the minimal US losses during the war years. In addition, from the defeated Germany and Japan, the United States got a huge amount technical documentation. Many German and Japanese aircraft designers who emigrated to the United States began to work in their aircraft industry.

Over time, the aviation industry of the USSR began to produce not only various types of aircraft and all the parts necessary for them, but also such a new type of aircraft as a helicopter. A significant contribution was made to the field of space and rocket technology.

From 1965 to 1985, the Soviet aviation industry experienced the greatest upsurge in its work. Many samples of military and civil aircraft were developed and put into mass production. The development and testing of promising models of aircraft was constantly taking place. This period is rightfully considered the "golden time" for the Soviet aviation industry.

Perestroika years

The perestroika that began in 1985 played a fatal role in the Soviet aviation industry. Whole line experiments and innovations that took place in the management of industry ended in failure. The development of many promising models of aircraft was stopped and many samples of modern, only recently developed aircraft were removed from mass production. At the end of 1991, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR was liquidated. This ended the glorious history of the Soviet aviation industry and began the history of the Russian aviation industry.

Many people know, and some even remember, that there was a time when aviation, the aviation industry in our country was given the closest attention. Considerable funds and resources were allocated for the creation and development of new aviation technology. And not only the military, the development priority of which was always necessary, but also civil and small aviation. Not a single, perhaps, direction in aviation was left without attention, thanks to the most famous engineering schools and design bureaus.

Eminent design bureaus created aircraft and helicopters for various fields of activity. Particular attention was paid to technology, the so-called dual purpose. For example, the main civil aircraft in the USSR were developed on the basis of strategic bombers. This made it possible not only to significantly reduce R & D costs, but also to obtain a fleet of unified equipment.

Aircraft factories could change their profile from military to civilian products and vice versa in a short time. In the production of general-purpose equipment, preference was given to the universality of the use of one or another type of aircraft, which could be used in various areas of the national economy, and not just for military purposes.

Retired Flag Officer

Of course, this did not apply to highly specialized military aircraft, fighter-interceptors, fighter bombers, etc. To a greater extent, this applied to transport aircraft and helicopters. Likewise, civilian aircraft and helicopters could be used for various military purposes.

I think that there is no need in this article to mention that such a high-tech industry as the aircraft industry provided a constant incentive for the development of other sectors of the national economy, even those that, it would seem, are remotely related to the development of the aircraft industry. Suffice it to mention here what a leap the Soviet industry was given by copying the American B-29 aircraft, and how many and many branches of industry had to be "pulled up" to the world level.

Tu-4, an analogue of the American strategic bomberB-29.

But, unfortunately, this attitude of the country's leadership towards the aviation industry seems to be a thing of the past. This does not apply to domestic military aviation, the necessity of which does not need to be proved and explained even to pro-Western Russian politicians and legislators.

Strange metamorphoses

But the latest history of civil aviation in our country is replete with sharp turns, turns and incomprehensible jumps.

On November 28, 1991, by decree of Boris Yeltsin, the Ministry of Civil Aviation was abolished, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Transport of the RSFSR.

It seems that this was the beginning of a long series of strange metamorphoses taking place with the civil aircraft industry in Russia. As a result of the infusion of the former MGA into the Ministry of Transport, the department of state policy in the field of civil aviation began to deal with civil aviation issues. That is, civil aviation has lost its exclusive positions and advantages over other modes of transport, and has become one of the 13 departments of the Ministry of Transport.

The same fate befell another key ministry - the Ministry of Aviation Industry. Having already gone through a series of abolitions and mergers, this ministry was nevertheless revived for the third time, on March 8, 1965. But, again, in the ill-fated 1991, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR was transferred to the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR. That is, it also lost its exclusive position.

On November 28, 1991, by decree of Boris Yeltsin, the Ministry of Aviation Industry was abolished, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR.

Then endless renaming and other perturbations began with the Ministry of Industry itself.

Now the aircraft industry is in charge of the Aviation Industry Department within the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.

What happened in the end: Ministry of Civil Aviation- as a single body in charge of everything that was connected with the very concept of "civil aviation", it went through the following stages of "development": (and in quotation marks, because it is very difficult to call it development, rather it is a slow degradation and extinction).

• Department of Air Transport of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation - 1991

  Federal Aviation Service of Russia - 1996

  Federal Air Transport Service of Russia - 1999

  State Civil Aviation Service of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation - 2000 (structural subdivision of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation)

  Federal Air Transport Agency - 2004 (Rosaviatsia, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation)

At the same time, the functions of the previous service ( public service GA of the Ministry of Transport) were distributed among the Federal Air Transport Agency, Rostransnadzor and the Ministry of Transport of Russia. And if in the usual world practice it is customary to unite all interested structures into a single unit in charge of all the core issues, then here we have a completely opposite trend.

Now there is such a "picture" Rosaviatsiya deals with:

Organization of execution of federal targeted programs and the federal targeted investment program;

Rendering of public importance public services on the conditions established by federal law to an indefinite circle of persons, including for the following purposes: implementation of a set of measures to organize the provision of international and domestic flights; implementation of a set of measures aimed at ensuring the security of transport infrastructure facilities and Vehicle from acts of unlawful interference;

Publication of individual legal acts on the basis of and in pursuance of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts and instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

Rostransnadzor carries out:

functions of control and supervision (including) in the field of air transport (civil aviation).

Moreover, this supervision is carried out in such a way that circulars and orders, orders and regulatory documents can be the same for air, sea and inland water (as well as urban electric, automobile, etc.). At the same time, the features of air transportation and aircraft operation are not taken into account at all.

And there is another structure that deals with GA issues: Department of State Policy in the field of civil aviation in the structure of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. The department has the following departments:

Department of Regulatory legal support and development of the activities of the civil aviation organization

Air Communications Department

Flight Standards Division

Department of technical standards and requirements

Department of Air Navigation Support

The head of all this huge transport economy is the Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation Mikhail Yuryevich Sokolov, an economist by basic education ( Faculty of Economics Leningrad State University 1991).

This is what concerns civil aviation in general, its regulation and organization in our country.

The disease progresses

As you know, all enterprises of the aviation industry, factories, design bureaus were united into UAC (United Aircraft Corporation, it was established in February 2006).

The State (Rosimushchestvo) owns 90.3% of UAC shares, that is, the State has a decisive voice in resolving all major issues related to the planning and production of domestic military and civil aviation equipment.

The diagram below shows the dynamics of the production of civil aircraft in the USSR\RSFSR\RF since 1969. A sharp drop in output in the early 90s and a complete decline in output after 1997 are clearly visible. The increase in the production of civilian aircraft is insignificant, it becomes noticeable only in 2009-2010. and then due to the start of production of the SSJ-100.

As we can see, instead of providing support to domestic aircraft manufacturers, good policy in the field of civil aviation, the Russian leadership supports and strongly encourages the import of used Boeing and Airbus aircraft into the country. It is they who currently make up the main fleet of domestic carriers.

With the advent of the UAC (recall, the beginning of 2006), there was no jump in the production of aircraft for civil aviation either. Of course, planes are not created in one day, but after all, UAC was not created from scratch! By the time of the merger, most Russian aircraft design bureaus had their own developments in new technology or in deep modernization of existing ones.

But strange and not very consistent projects are emerging in the aviation industry. Powerfully lobbied in the government for the project of the purely military corporation Sukhoi, the SSJ-100 aircraft, instead of the almost completely domestic Tu-334. Even the Ukrainian engine D-436, which is being produced for it, was created with the participation of Russian developers. This lobbying was not difficult to foresee, given that the KLA had long been led by a former CEO OKB Sukhoi Pogosyan M.A., who simultaneously remained the Chairman of the Board of Directors of OAO Sukhoi Design Bureau.

The SSJ100 aircraft is certainly good in its niche, but even with a stretch it cannot be called a domestically developed aircraft, just look at the picture.

Look carefully at the picture, all the main systems of the aircraft are of foreign design. Of the domestic products, only "iron" remained: the center section, wings, parts of the fuselage, and pylons.

It is possible to list for a long time the “strange things” happening in the domestic aviation industry, starting with the abolition of the Ministry of Aviation Industry itself. One can give examples of outright sabotage in the industry of our civil aircraft production, about open lobbying of foreign aircraft, about the abolition of duties on their import to the Russian Federation, about receiving “kickbacks”, it is better to give some figures.

About $45 billion was spent on the purchase of Boeing and Airbus aircraft by domestic airlines, plus planned contracts for another $30 billion.

Thus, there are more than 250 seats in the aircraft category, and the funds actually spent for the purchase of 70 Boeings and 20 Airbuses (about $9 billion) could have been used to build 148 modernized Il-96s. The $30 billion spent on the purchase of almost 350 aircraft of these consortiums would make it possible to replenish the domestic fleet with 450 Tu-204/214 aircraft. In the category of 75-150 seats, about five billion dollars went into the purchase of Bombardier, ATR-42 and other foreign aircraft, instead of building more than a hundred An-148, An-140 and Il-114.

And one more quote from an article by Pyotr Zakharov in the Military Industrial Courier "Flights and Kickbacks":

At the same time, a whole staff of lured experts is working on the idea of ​​belittling the merits of domestic aviation equipment produced in wide cooperation, sowing in the public mind an inferiority complex of the “Made in Russia” brand. But don't we own the world's best wide-body airliner Il-96, which is part of the presidential aviation squadron? Wasn't it the Tupolev company that certified the Tu-334-100 aircraft a decade and a half ago, created in accordance with the presidential program "Development of civil aviation technology in Russia until the year 2000"? Doesn't there exist a regional An-148, well-loved by passengers and pilots, adapted to the very imperfect domestic airfields, regularly carrying out missions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and other special departments? Is it impossible to put other types and sizes of vehicles on the wing - Tu-204/214, Il-114, An-140 (the latter is indispensable for transportation in the Far North and southern temperature extremes)? Or is the country deprived of the potential and groundwork for the production of the entire line of new helicopters (from light Ansat type to world record holders in terms of payload) and remotorization on the advanced technological basis of the Mi-8/17/171?

As they say, comments are superfluous. And I would like to finish my review in more joyful colors, but so far it does not work out.

The restoration of the country's technological sovereignty requires the immediate eradication of bureaucratic inertia and pure sabotage from the aviation industry. The Russian aviation authorities - now we can talk about it with confidence - are not interested in the development of domestic aircraft and engine building. It is more profitable for them to deal with Western "partners". The cynicism towards our own aviation industry is not limited to the provision of explicit and hidden preferences to foreign manufacturers while ignoring the engineering developments of our own firms and schools.

On November 10, 1917, at the direction of V.I. Lenin, the Bureau of Aviation and Aeronautics Commissars was formed under the Military Revolutionary Committee, which began the selection and registration of aviation personnel and the organization of the collection, accounting and protection of aviation property left over from the old regime.
The Bureau of Commissars was the first revolutionary body for the construction of the Soviet air fleet and the aviation industry.
On December 20, 1917, the All-Russian Collegium for the Management of the Air Fleet of the Republic was established. The Collegium united all branches of aviation and aeronautics, carried out management of aviation enterprises.
By order of the People's Commissariat of War No. 385 of May 24, 1918, at the direction of V.I. Lenin, the Main Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet (Glavvozdukhflot) was established, which manages the country's military air forces and aircraft repair enterprises.
According to records, in September 1918, the air squadrons of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet (RKKVF) had 266 serviceable and 59 defective airplanes. In addition, there were 169 serviceable aircraft in the central warehouses and air parks. Thus, excluding aircraft factories and flight schools, the Red Air Fleet had 435 combat-ready aircraft.
On December 1, 1918, V.I. Lenin supported the initiative of N.E. Zhukovsky and his student A.N. Tupolev to establish the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - later famous TsAGI, which led the country's aviation science.

At the final stage of the civil war, the existing plants of the Russian military industry were allocated by the Soviet government to a special production group subordinate to the Main Directorate of the Military Industry (GUVP) of the All-Russian Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the RSFSR. The GUVP included: the Industrial Military Council, the Central Directorate of Artillery Plants and the Main Directorate of United Aviation Plants (Glavkoavia). As of January 1, 1921, 62 enterprises were subordinate to the GUVP VSNKh, which employed about 130 thousand people. By a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of November 12, 1923, the entire military, including aviation, industry was transferred to the all-Union jurisdiction.

Until 1939, the state administration of the aviation industry was distinguished by the frequent transfer of the industry from one department to another and the reform of the structure. All production of aviation equipment was concentrated in the design bureau, where prototypes of aircraft were developed and produced. There was practically no serial production of aircraft, with the exception of aircraft produced under foreign licenses (including the DC-3 Dakota).
In 1930, the industry contained factories: Aircraft building - 7, Engine building - 4, Repair - 6, Utility - 5, Experimental - 3.
Over the years, the aviation industry has been led by the following state structures:
1925 - 1930 State Aviation Industry Trust - Aviation Trust of the Main Directorate of the Metallurgical Industry of the Supreme Council of National Economy.
1930 - 1934 All-Union Aviation Industry Association (VOA) of the Supreme Economic Council.
1934 - 1936 The Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP) of the Narkomtyazhprom.
1936 - 1939 The First Main Directorate (aircraft) of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS AND MINISTERS OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY OF THE USSR

(1888-1941) - People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1939 - 1940.
(1904-1975) - People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1940 - 1946.
Khrunichev Mikhail Vasilievich(1901-1961) - People's Commissar (Minister) of the USSR aviation industry in 1946 - 1953.
(1907-1977) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1953 - 1977.
- Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on aviation technology in 1957 - 1965.
(1916-1981) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1977 - 1981.
SILAEV Ivan Stepanovich(1930-) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1981 - 1985.
Systsov Apollon Sergeevich(1929-2005) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1985 - 1991.